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Abstract 
Why is Chile following such a proactive FTA policy and at the same time promoting the 
benefits of these type of agreements to other Latin American countries? There is a pre-
dominance of economic explanations to analyze why countries pursue an active FTA pol-
icy. Yet within an FTA policy, understood as an essential component of a country’s foreign 
policy, strategic and ideational goals are also important. Without downgrading economic 
explanations, I argue in this article that Chile’s proactive FTA policy can also be under-
stood using variables from “traditional” international relations such as power, governance, 
and ideas. A framework based on such political-economic strategic issues and value-based 
ideas provides a better understanding of the country’s motivations in implementing such a 
proactive FTA policy.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Macht, Governance und Ideen in Chiles Freihandelspolitik 
Was sind die Gründe für Chiles derartig aktive Freihandelspolitik und dafür, dass Chile 
die Vorteile dieser Art von Abkommen gleichzeitig auch anderen lateinamerikanischen 
Staaten anpreist? Zur Erklärung, warum Länder eine aktive Freihandelspolitik verfolgen, 
werden überwiegend ökonomische Gründe aufgeführt. Doch bei einer aktiven Freihan-
delspolitik, die als wichtiger Bestandteil der Außenpolitik angesehen wird, müssen auch 
strategische und ideelle Ziele Berücksichtigung finden. Ohne die ökonomischen Erklärun-
gen abzuwerten, wird in diesem Beitrag die Auffassung vertreten, dass Chiles aktive Frei-
handelspolitik auch als Rückgriff auf „traditionelle“ Variablen der internationalen Bezie-
hungen wie Macht, Governance und Ideen verstanden werden kann. Eine Darstellung der 
politisch-ökonomischen Strategiefragen und der ideellen Aspekte lässt die Beweggründe 
dieses Landes für eine solch aktive Freihandelspolitik einfacher nachvollziehen. 
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1 Introduction 
Chile is the most active country in negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in the global 
economic world.1 The country enjoys expertise on how to negotiate and build these com-
mercial accords as it has signed around 19 FTAs including the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) (see Table 1).2 Chile’s FTA approach is a long-term policy as its trade 
negotiations have not been stalled by unfavorable external economic conditions such as the 
Asian and the sub-prime crises. Moreover, Chile is always ready and willing to share its ne-
gotiating experience with other Latin American countries that may become direct economic 
competitors, such as Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia and Panama. It even supports these coun-
tries in joining extant FTAs such as the P4 and economic forums such as APEC, which are 
also used as arenas to monitor possible FTAs (Furche 2008). 
                                                     
1  An FTA has the purpose of securing commercial preferential treatment between signatory countries vis-à-vis 
third countries that are excluded from such an agreement (Corning 2007: 45). 
2  EPAs are FTAs that include other issues such as economic cooperation and development. Sometimes they in-
clude non-trade-related issues. Complementary Agreements (CA) and Partial Trade Agreements (PTA) are 
not considered FTAs because of their limited scope. These latter two types are also included in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Chile’s FTAs 
Country / regional bloc Type of accord Date of signature Status 
P4 (I) EPA 18.07.2005 implemented (08.11.2006) 
EU (II) EPA 18.11.2002 implemented (01.02.2003) 
Japan EPA 27.03.2007 implemented (03.09.2007) 
Canada FTA 05.12.1996 implemented (05.07.1997) 
South Korea FTA 15.02.2003 implemented (01.04.2004) 
China FTA 18.11.2005 implemented (01.10.2006) 
Costa Rica (III)  FTA 18.10.1999 bilateral protocol implemented (14.02.2002)
El Salvador (III) FTA 18.10.1999 bilateral protocol implemented (03.06.2002)
Honduras (III) FTA 18.10.1999 bilateral protocol implemented (18.07.2008)
USA  FTA 06.06.2003 implemented (01.01.2004) 
Mexico  FTA 17.04.1998 implemented (01.08.1999) 
EFTA (IV) FTA 26.06.2003 implemented (01.12.2004) 
Panama FTA 27.06.2006 implemented (07.03.2008) 
Peru FTA 22.08.2006 implemented (01.03.2009) 
Colombia FTA 27.11.2006 implemented (08/05/2009) 
Australia FTA 30.07.2008 implemented (06/03/2009) 
Guatemala (III) FTA 18.10.1999 bilateral protocol on ratification process 
Nicaragua (III) FTA 18.10.1999 bilateral protocol on negotiation 
Turkey FTA N/A concluded in agreement (20.03.2009) 
Malaysia  FTA N/A under negotiation 
Vietnam FTA N/A under negotiation 
India PTA 08.03.2006 implemented (17.08.2008) 
Cuba PTA 21.08.1998 (V) implemented (28.08.2008) 
Ecuador CA 20.12.1994 implemented (01.01.1995) 
Mercosur (VI) CA 25.06.1996 implemented (01.10.1996) 
Bolivia CA 06.04.1993 implemented (07.07.1993) 
Venezuela CA 02.04.1993 implemented (01.07.1993) 
Notes: I     New Zealand, Singapore, Chile and Brunei are the P4 members. 
II The EU has 27 member states. 
III Chile negotiated a common FTA framework with Central America and then bilateral protocols with 
each country. It is still negotiating this protocol with Nicaragua. 
IV Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland constitute the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA). 
V This is the date on which Cuba and Chile concluded the negotiation. 
VI Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay are full members. 
Source: Direcon-Chile: www.direcon.cl. 
Despite the evident rush of this Latin American country to finalize FTAs, there are no clear 
explanations for its pursuit of such a proactive policy beyond the pure economic logic of 
maximizing the welfare of consumers and the net gains of producers. Why is Chile following 
such a proactive FTA policy and at the same time promoting the benefits of these type of agreements 
to other Latin American countries? If these questions are analyzed using an economic logic, the 
answers are rather obvious: 
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• Chile negotiates FTAs to create trade and to impede its diminution by third parties pos-
sibly leaving Chile out of these accords or out of regional economic groupings (Viner 
1950, Baldwin 2006: 1467-1468). 
• Chile has the goal of achieving a high number of FTAs in order to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Gerber 2000). 
• In a North-South context, Chile has signed FTAs with the main economic centers of the 
world in order to increase the export volumes of its most competitive products, which 
are mainly commodities. 
• In a South-South context, Chile’s FTA policy has the goal of promoting the export of 
products with greater added value (industrial goods), which are usually produced by 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Rosales 2008). 
• Chile shares its negotiating experience and the benefits of an FTA policy with other Latin 
American countries because its production chain has expanded to other countries on the 
continent, along with growing capital investments coming from Chile. 
This utility-maximizing rationale is one of the main forces for jumping onto this wave of 
FTAs. However, economic institutions such as FTAs do not exist in a vacuum. They also re-
flect political interests and the values of states, as well as the ambitions of middle-sized or 
small powers to influence and shape, at the least, their regional setting. In other words, pure 
economic explanations do not capture the political dimension of elaborating and conducting 
an FTA policy. An FTA policy is also a constitutive part of the foreign policy of a country, 
and as such it may be used to achieve strategic goals and promote values which are part of 
the world and regional views of a state. 
Therefore, I argue in this paper that Chile is also seeking to realize its foreign policy goals 
through FTAs, following a strategic political-economic rationale as well as its value-based 
ideas.3 First, Chile is trying to balance the power of other states or regional blocs in Latin 
America, to reduce the asymmetric economic dependence on global powers and the poten-
tial political influence these powers might exert, and to achieve a greater international repu-
tation. Second, Chile is seeking to implement more specific rules of the game as well as ad 
hoc mechanisms of global economic governance that reflect the specificity of its economic 
context and reality. Finally, Chile is seeking to shape how the construction of economic inte-
gration should be in Latin America by promoting its own conception of the market as welfare 
enhancer. This initiative not only helps other countries on the continent to “lock-in” the 
model internationally but it also acts as a self-validating mechanism for Chile’s own pattern 
of development. Thus, if the external relations of a small country are usually constituted around 
                                                     
3  In this regard, states use economic issues strategically. Moreover, value-based ideas on patterns of develop-
ment as well as economic issues and traditional issues of foreign policy overlap and mix in an international 
trade agenda. 
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power concerns, the need for better and context-based governance mechanisms, and value-based ideas, 
then these may also be driving forces in pursuing such a proactive FTA policy. 
This article is structured in the following way: First, I introduce the analytical framework, 
which helps to explain why Chile is so proactive in formulating an FTA policy. Here I rely on 
elements of neorealism and institutionalism to outline the power-based goals that Chile seeks 
to achieve through its FTA policy. I then present the theoretical aspects of governance, taken 
from institutionalism, that help to analyze Chile’s FTAs as governance institutions. At the 
end of this section I introduce a constructivist theoretical conception of the FTA as a reflection 
of an intersubjective societal understanding. Rather than contributing to the theoretical de-
bate, this article seeks to solve an empirically grounded puzzle by using elements of the three 
grand theories of international relations in a rather eclectic way.4 Second, I assess Chile’s FTA 
policy as a means to achieve strategic political-economic goals according to power-based ex-
planations. Third, I analyze another political-economic strategic goal of Chile’s FTA policy, 
which is to have rules for global economic governance that represent the specificity of the po-
litical-economic reality of Chile. Here I focus on the mechanisms for managing investment 
matters as an illustrative case (investment chapters). Fourth, I assess whether and to what ex-
tent ideational aspects are constitutive parts of the country’s FTA policy as well as why Chile 
is so keen to share its negotiating experience and to invite other countries to join extant FTAs. 
Here I use some data taken from opinion poll studies, which are supplemented by an analy-
sis of the speeches and public statements of key representatives of civil society as well as the 
government. The conclusion assesses which of these three forces—power, governance, or 
ideas—has more power to explain the FTA policy of this country, or whether they have to be 
seen as complementary approaches. 
2 Analytical Framework 
2.1 A Power-based Explanation 
According to neorealism, power is expressed in the material capabilities states have to 
achieve their foreign policy goals. States usually exercise power based on their material ca-
pabilities and on their relative power position (Rose 1998). The economic sphere is only an-
other dimension in which power is displayed and sought (Gilpin 1987, 2001, Grieco 1990). 
Following a relational conception of power, a state like Chile may be categorized as a mid-
dle-sized power that uses its power assets to influence and shape the course of external rela-
tions within its region. And on the global level, it may act as a small power by trying to re-
duce the asymmetrical economic dependence on, and the potential political influence com-
                                                     
4  The benefits of using analytical eclecticism have mainly been introduced, and developed by Peter Katzenstein 
in his various publications: see especially P. Katzenstein and S. Rudra (2004). 
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ing from, one or a few economic power centers. However, influencing other Latin American 
countries and balancing the power of countries or regional groupings within and outside 
Latin America is not conducted in hard terms within an FTA policy. 
In this regard, institutionalism highlights the fact that the economic world is interdependent, 
something which makes the use of hard power a costly business. In the interdependent 
world, states instead use soft balancing (Fortman et al. 2004: 370) or create a new set of insti-
tutions as a form of institutional balancing (He 2008: 492). Soft power is thus present in the 
economic sphere (Nye 2007: 165-167). In trade wars it is likely that states will use hard and 
economic power such as threats and sanctions, but within FTAs countries place a stronger 
emphasis on framing the FTA as a win-win situation, highlighting elements of economic and 
soft power. Thus, having multiple FTAs may act as a soft mechanism for influencing other 
countries, as an institutional balancing mechanism, and as the means to diffuse the political-
economic weight of the most important economic powers of the world. 
2.2 A Governance-based Explanation 
Power-based goals are only one dimension of the strategic goals a state seeks to achieve 
when it pursues an FTA policy. Institutions, such as these trade accords, are also the mani-
festation and the result of cooperative behavior between states. Cooperation is a strategic 
choice amongst states (Keohane 2005). Imposing a desired policy or an interest-based behav-
ior is not the way middle-sized or small powers act within the international system. It is also 
certainly not the case for a regional and hegemonic power when it comes to FTAs. On the 
contrary, launching an FTA negotiation is based on attracting and convincing the counter-
part(s) that a trade agreement will not only boost their economic exchange but also reduce 
the transaction costs of their political-economic relationship. 
Establishing institutions such as FTAs is a way to face the uncertainty posed by the even 
more complex situation of the WTO trade-based regime, although FTAs do not necessarily 
oppose the essence of the rules of this multilateral institution. Having FTAs is thus a way to 
deal with the challenges of economic globalization. Economic globalization has created a 
need amongst states to design better rule-based mechanisms for managing the world econ-
omy as the movement of capital, goods, and services increases (Schirm 2004: 3-7). States 
have been able to develop a sophisticated and complex rule-making system on multiple lev-
els covering a broad set of issue areas, although this system is still far from being flawless as 
the recent financial crises show. 
The global economic governance system as a whole is composed of multilateral institutions 
such as the WTO and the IMF; interregional institutions such as EU-Mercosur and APEC; 
regional institutions such as Mercosur, NAFTA, and the EU; sub-regional institutions such 
as the Euro regions; and the bilateral relations between states (Loewen 2006). Yet all these 
10 Wehner: Power, Governance, and Ideas in Chile’s Free Trade Agreement Policy  
levels are intertwined. Thus, some rules that originate on one level may be implemented 
completely or partially, as well as adapted, by actors or institutions on other levels in both a 
top-down and a bottom-up direction. This flow of rules may also be horizontal, that is, from 
institutions or actors at the same level of governance, for example, from the IMF to the WTO 
or from the EU to Mercosur (Woolcock 2006). 
Therefore, FTAs represent only a small but nevertheless important fraction of the rule mak-
ing needed to manage the economic world. One of the purposes of the FTAs as governance 
mechanisms is to provide certainty to the economic actors and the states in their relation-
ships. Another is to design rules that reflect the political-economic reality of each country as 
well as the specificity of the economic relation of the parties involved in an FTA negotiation. 
2.3 An Ideational-based Contextual Understanding 
Ideas play a strong role in the way the policy preferences of state actors are elaborated and 
implemented. Ideational forces take the form of worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal 
beliefs in international relations, although these are intertwined and mutually constitutive 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993). International actions are not only based on a cost-benefit 
analysis, they are also the manifestation of an intersubjective process of mutual understand-
ing (March and Olsen 1998). Prevalent ideational aspects that underlie societal projects are 
path dependent. Thus, the meaning of such prevailing societal ideas has to be shared by a 
majority of actors (Schirm 2004). If a society shares the value-based idea that an open market 
economy enhances the welfare of its society in the long run, then this mutual understanding may 
facilitate the undertaking of a proactive and intense FTA policy by leaders and states. This 
does not mean there are not other ideational aspects in a society trying to contest and dis-
place prevailing ideas in the long run (Schirm 2008: 5). 
As part of the international actions of a country, an FTA policy may also be the reflection of 
the prevailing idea that an open market economy improves the welfare of citizens.5 However, pre-
vailing ideas and values are usually not the same for each country, although some may 
share certain notions and the underlying value-based idea of an economic model. The im-
pact of ideational aspects from middle-sized or small countries on others is rather diffuse in 
the case of countries that are outside a region as interstate socialization is more sporadic. In 
these cases the trade agenda is instead interest driven, although it serves the purpose of re-
inforcing value-based ideas at the domestic level. Ideational aspects may be more concrete 
and have a more major impact when countries are part of the same region, have a similar 
culture, and share common past experiences. Here interests and ideas reinforce each other 
                                                     
5  I also use the ideational aspect “market as welfare enhancer” in this section as it also reflects the idea that an 
open economy or a market-driven economy increases the welfare of citizens in the long run. 
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when there are common regional views among actors on how and under what pillars politi-
cal-economic integration should be founded and sustained. 
In addition, in a regional setting the same principles may also be more intensively contested 
by other states that share the view that strong state intervention is the path to socioeconomic 
development. This ideational aspect may also impact the way these actors conceive of and 
promote regional integration. In other words, competing or complementary views on what 
integration ”should look like” are not only interest-based but also idea-based. Thus, prevail-
ing societal ideas facilitate or constrain the external relations of a country and form the re-
gional views of a country; these may be accepted and shared by some state actors within a 
geographical region and contested by others. 
3 The Power-based Goals of Chile’s FTAs 
One of the main foreign policy goals of Chile once the transition to democracy started in 
1990 was its reacceptance in the international system. To achieve this, Chile opted to give 
priority to the use of economic integration. Internally, political and economic elites saw eco-
nomic integration as the least conflictive area on which to build up a consistent foreign pol-
icy for the future since it produced unity in the political parties represented in congress from 
the Right to the Left. Externally, Chile’s first democratic governments also perceived that 
other countries in Latin America and in the world would find Chile’s economic integration 
model easy to accept. Most of the Latin American countries were also converting to market 
economies, and the acceptance of this way of reentering the international arena was also 
guaranteed at the global level as the major economic powers such as the US and the EU 
were the main promoters of economic integration. 
Not only does the government of Chile want to satisfy its endogenous economic actors with 
its FTA policy, but it also wants to achieve an international reputation that allows it to influ-
ence the process of integration on the Latin American continent (Morande 2003: 252-253). 
“FTA talks can be used as a tool to improve countries’ status and image by allowing them, 
on the one hand, to display ‘benign leadership’ through collaborative economic projects” 
(Solis and Katada 2008: 249). 
Chile sees the achievement of an FTA with the US in 2003 as a source of pride and success as 
it has become a sort of “quality stamp” for the Chilean economic model, with a direct effect 
on the image and international status of the country. As then president Ricardo Lagos (2000-
2004) said with regard to the country’s FTA with the US, 
Today Chile is part of the world. Our small and far away country that in previous pe-
riods was isolated and marginalized becomes today a first class partner of the main 
hubs of the world economy. Months ago it was with Europe, weeks ago it was with 
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South Korea and today with the United States of America. All this happened in one 
year.6 (quoted in Fuentes 2006: 120)  
Influence on the continent’s integration process cannot be exerted by the size of the Chilean 
market as such, so influencing others is based on the strategy of attracting possible negotia-
tion counterparts by promoting the success of Chile’s economic reforms, its good perform-
ance in the global economy, and its know-how in building these agreements. 
Chile depends to a large extent on commodity exports, so it tends to adopt a defensive posi-
tion in the world economy with regard to global hubs. On the one hand, it wants to have ac-
cess to relevant economic markets for economic reasons, but on the other hand, it does not 
want to be too heavily dependent on one of them, for both economic (vulnerability) and po-
litical reasons (political influence) (Ulloa Urrutia 2003: 25, Wesley 2008: 223). This is espe-
cially the case for the country’s relationship with the US. “The dependence on one market 
also produces volatility regarding prices and constrains the political and economic inde-
pendence of a country” (López Giral 2006: 717).7 While Chile sought to have an FTA with 
the US, it also wants to reduce the asymmetric economic dependence on this market by pur-
suing previous, parallel, and subsequent FTA negotiations with other industrialized coun-
tries or regions such as the EU (2002), Korea (2003), China (2006), and Japan (2007).8 Al-
though Chile signed its FTA with the US in 2003, after those with Korea and the EU, it was 
always Chile’s main priority to negotiate an FTA with the US, either by trying to join 
NAFTA or by negotiating a bilateral FTA (Verdugo 2005: 160). Yet the dynamics of domestic 
politics in the US impeded the achievement of this goal in the 1990s. 
With this strategy of negotiating with commercial hubs of the world economy and not gen-
erating too strong a dependency on one or two of those economic centers, Chile has also put 
special effort into achieving commercial accords with the Latin American countries as a way 
to exert a certain influence over the process of integration in the region. It has negotiated ac-
cords with Mercosur (1996), Mexico (1998), the Central American countries (1999), Colombia 
(2006), Peru (2006), and Panama (2008). Based on its strategic need to not becoming a spoke of 
the integration process in the global economy, Chile has become a hub on the Latin Ameri-
can continent (Rosales 2008, Zechner 2002: 124). This game of hubs and spokes may favor the 
former in economic exchange, since the hubs can freely trade with every spoke but the spokes 
will face limitations on trading with other spokes due to the lack of accords between them 
(Wonnacott 1996). Therefore, as a hub Chile may have, at least potentially, the tools to exert 
                                                     
6  Author’s translation. 
7  Author’s translation. 
8  Chile has been rather successful in reducing this asymmetric economic dependence by diversifying its trade 
relations. In the early 1990s Chile’s main market for exports was the US, followed by Japan; currently it is 
China (15.2%) and then the US (13.1%). If the EU is taken as a whole, then Chile’s exports to this region are 
higher than those to the two previous markets (21.5%) (Direcon 2008: 12, Silva 2001: 15). 
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a certain degree of influence in the way flows of products and services are distributed on the 
Latin American continent. Yet being a hub is not only about controlling commercial flows; it 
is also about gaining political leverage over the integration schemes and over how this inte-
gration should be conducted (Smith 2001: 49). 
The FTA policy of a country can also have an effect on the way border issues are treated 
(McDonald 2004). Chile negotiated an FTA with Peru which is based on a previous Com-
plementary Agreement (1998). It also has a low-scope trade accords with Bolivia (1993), with 
which maritime and territorial disputes exist. These conflictive relations are the consequence 
of the Nitrate War in 1879-1884 and the resulting peace and border accords with Peru in 
1929 and Bolivia in 1904. As consequence of this war, Bolivia lost access to the sea, which 
has been the main issue in its foreign policy towards Chile since then. Peru and Chile also 
have ongoing disputes over the territorial and maritime borders (Valdivieso 2007). Chile is 
the status quo country with regard to these issues. In the first years of democracy, Chile did 
not know much about the intentions, interests, and possible reactions of its neighboring 
countries if border issues were the only item on their foreign policy agendas. Neither did 
Peru nor Bolivia know about the possible reactions of Chile if the respective bilateral rela-
tions were to be coupled with security issues. 
In accordance with the commercial peace literature, which holds that commercial relations 
increase the cost of using military means to solve border issues (Oneal 1999, Gartzke/Li/ 
Boehemer 2001), Chile’s FTA policy has thus helped to reduce the focus on security in 
Chile’s relations with its neighbor countries. After achieving complementary trade agree-
ments with Bolivia and Peru, and an FTA with Peru (2006), the option of using military 
means to tackle the border discrepancies was seen as nonviable in the medium and long 
term because of the decline in trade relations and in the economic welfare of each state that 
would result. As José Miguel Inzulsa, the minister of foreign affairs under then president 
Eduardo Frei (1994-1998), said, “the economic complementation and integration agreements 
which we have promoted in recent years, although mainly concerned with trade, can also 
have implications as regards increasing the security of Chile in our regional environment” 
(quoted in Saéz and Valdés 1999: 94). 
Chile is an associate and not a full member of Mercosur. Even though one of the most con-
vincing justifications for this status is that Chile has a lower tariff rate than that of Mercosur, 
Chile’s government believes that this bloc could undermine the country’s independence re-
garding its foreign policy goals. Moreover, it sees Mercosur as a political arena rather than a 
global market-driven project, which is what Chile would prefer. Chile thus has an ambiva-
lent position towards this regional grouping. On the one hand, it is committed to its eco-
nomic growth, but on the other hand, it does not want Mercosur to become a political plat-
form for projects based on state intervention in the economy, or for Venezuela’s Bolivarian 
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project (Portilla 2006). The skeptical viewpoint on this group is also based on Chile’s percep-
tions that Mercosur’s institutions are not efficient enough to deal with the political and eco-
nomic disputes that have emerged among the member states. 
In fact, Chile does not want to step back from Mercosur since it has strong economic ties 
with it. Instead, Chile is pursuing a soft-balancing strategy as it wants to lessen both its eco-
nomic dependence on this integration scheme and Mercosur’s potential political influence. 
Therefore, Chile has used the strategy of diversifying its commercial relations by having dif-
ferent FTAs on the continent. It has recently rejoined the Andean Community and it is seek-
ing the convergence of its FTAs with Colombia, Peru and possibly Mexico as a way of bal-
ancing the pattern of development based on more state intervention promoted by Mercosur, 
and especially by Venezuela and Argentina. 
By opening new markets and by having FTAs with all the economic powers and developing 
countries, Chile is increasing its overall external trade dependence. However, it is also re-
ducing both the economic impact and the potential political influence that world powers 
and regional groupings may exert over it through the diffusing effect that multiple commer-
cial ties produces. 
4 Chile’s FTAs as Governance Institutions 
Chile’s FTAs are focused not only on the removal of tariffs but also on the management of a 
diverse array of issue areas such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the use of techni-
cal barriers to trade, public procurement, normalization measures, trade conflicts, property 
rights, rules of origin, services and investment, etc. The joint points on these issues are the 
facilitation of trade in goods and services as well as the creation of conditions which impede 
discrimination against incoming products and services vis-à-vis national ones. As the minis-
ter of foreign affairs Soledad Alvear said in 2005, “These accords allow us to ensure clear 
rules of the game as well as juridical certainty for the decisions of our exporters and inves-
tors” (Verdugo 2005: 165).9
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) has been one of the key issues in Chile’s trade pol-
icy and economic growth. Chile’s FTAs include investment chapters with the purpose of de-
lineating clear rules to protect and facilitate its own FDI abroad and the incoming invest-
ment from the counterpart.10 “In general these agreements are designed to give foreign in-
                                                     
9  Author’s translation. 
10  In some FTA negotiations Chile and its respective counterparts included the modality of negotiating the 
chapters over services and investments after the FTA was in force, e.g., with China and the P4. The former 
negotiation has already been concluded and the new chapters are part of the main FTA. The P4 negotiations 
on investment and services are ongoing. The US has joined the P4 negotiation process on investment and ser-
vices as a step towards becoming a member of this accord. 
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vestors national treatment, to create a most-favored-nation (MFN) form of investment, to 
end the performance requirements, and to eliminate restrictions on the return of capital and 
revenues” (Gerber 2000: 48).11
The investment matters in Chile’s FTAs include different elements taken from multilateral 
accords that are part of the WTO trade-based regime, such as the Agreement on Trade-
related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), the Agreement on Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the Understanding on the Settle-
ment of Disputes (DSU). Chile has also either included elements of or completely adopted its 
previous Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in some of its FTAs. These BITs are also nested 
in the WTO rules (Sauvé 2006: 9-28). In other FTAs it has adopted the NAFTA approach on 
investment (Reiter 2006). Whereas the BITs seek to protect investment, the NAFTA model of 
FTAs both protects and liberalizes the investment regime in areas and stages that produce de 
facto discrimination against foreign investors. 
The FTAs that completely adopt preexisting BITs are those with Central America (Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) and Panama. These FTAs only 
seek to confirm the duties and rights the respective parties adopted in their previous bilat-
eral BITs (Chapter 10, Chile–Central America FTA, and Chapter 9, Chile–Panama TLC). In 
the agreements, the different parties include the possibility of broadening the scope of the 
investment chapter by establishing an open clause that evaluates the BIT’s accords with the 
purpose of improving them and including new issues, for example, those of the NAFTA 
model (see article 9.2, Chile–Panama FTA text, and article 10.2, Chile–Central America FTA 
text). However, in the case of Panama there is no timeframe outlined for starting future ne-
gotiations over this matter, whereas in the case of Central America the timeframe is the first 
two years after the FTA came into force. 
Negotiating a new common framework on investment with Central America as a whole is 
not possible since the bilateral protocol with Nicaragua has not yet been concluded. There is 
still the possibility of negotiating investment issues in a bilateral way with those countries 
with which the FTA is in force; however, this has not happened. One reason for this is that 
the flows of FDI between Chile and each of these countries is not high enough, giving the 
negotiation of these issues a low priority on Chile’s external trade agenda. Thus, Chile seems 
to see keeping the BITs as the most realistic option, because it has ongoing FTA negotiations 
to which devote time and human resources. 
The BITs include rules to give national and most favored nation (MFN) treatment to the 
counterpart investor, and to allow the free transfer of capital, interests, rents, and utilities as 
well as the capital obtained in the total or partial selling of an investment. Moreover, these 
                                                     
11  Author’s translation. 
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BITs with Central America and Panama prohibit the direct or indirect expropriation of an 
investment in an arbitrary way. This means that if expropriation is necessary, it has to be 
undertaken on a nondiscriminatory basis; for a public purpose; in accordance with due 
process of law; and accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective monetary compensa-
tion in accordance with market value. In addition, these treaties include specific mechanisms 
for the settlement of disputes between states as well as between a particular investor and a 
state (BIT texts for Chile–Costa Rica, Chile–El Salvador, Chile–Panama: articles I-XI). 
Those FTAs that follow a NAFTA pattern on investment measures have a broader scope as 
they are also intended to liberalize each party’s investment regimes. These FTAs are those 
with Canada, the US, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Australia, Japan, and South Korea.12 These 
FTAs remove the performance requirement, which means that parties cannot impose certain 
obligations on each other’s investments, for example, to produce given level of exports, to 
achieve a given level of domestic content, or to purchase locally produced goods in the pro-
duction process or in the delivery of a service. These chapters of the FTAs also state that giv-
ing grants and subsidies to foreign investors cannot be subject to the fulfillment of perform-
ance requirements. These FTAs also provide national treatment to the foreign investors in 
the preestablishment phase. Moreover, Chile’s NAFTA model for FTAs also removes the na-
tionality requirement for managers and the members of the boards of directors in enter-
prises that are covered investments. Yet, in the case of the constitution of a board of direc-
tors, a signatory party to the agreement may eventually require that a majority or less of a 
board’s members be nationals or residents of the country that receives the investment. This 
latter is valid to the extent it does not hamper the ability of the investor to exert control over 
its own investment in any way (Reiter 2006: 220-222, 227-229). 
A different case compared to those above is that of the FTA with the EU. The investment 
chapter in the EU–Chile FTA is a mixture of BITs, and some NAFTA rules. For example, it 
does not provide a mechanism for dispute settlements between a private investor and a state 
as the BITs with Central America or the NAFTA-model FTAs do. It does not remove the per-
formance requirements and does not have clauses on expropriation and compensation meas-
ures. While this accord provides national treatment, it does not grant MFN treatment. There-
fore, the focus of the investment chapter within this FTA lies on granting national treatment 
in the access, entry, and establishment of foreign investors as well as on allowing the free and 
rapid transfer of funds and capital movement (see Chile–EU FTA text, Title III Trade in ser-
vices and establishment: Chapter III establishment, articles 130-134). 
Chile’s investment provisions in its FTAs are usually negotiated using a negative list ap-
proach. This means that the different clauses that deal with liberalization measures—national 
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treatment, MFN status, the preestablishment of commitments, and expropriation—do not 
apply to specific nonconforming measures, which are usually in the annexes of each FTA. For 
example, the FTA with Canada has a specific nonconforming measure over indigenous popu-
lations and related issues (Chile–Canada FTA text, Annex I)13, and the FTA with the US has 
nonconforming measures on cultural issues. Chile cannot increase the level of protection on 
the nonconforming measures. Yet these measures are subject to ratchet provisions, with the 
purpose of facilitating a future liberalization of the respective national investment regimes. If 
either Chile or its counterparts unilaterally decide to liberalize those measures, these new re-
formed issues will automatically be included in the respective FTAs. 
One of the key issues in Chile’s FTAs is to maintain the country’s right to preserve the stabil-
ity of its currency system in the event of a crisis. Chile does this through the annexes of its in-
vestment chapters on current payments and capital movements. The measures are devoted to 
“the establishment of restrictions or limitations on current payments and transfers (capital 
movements) to or from Chile, as well as transactions related to them, such as requiring that 
deposit, investments or credits from or to a foreign country, be subject to a reserve require-
ment (encaje)” (Chile–Japan FTA 2007, Annex 8 clause 1). The rationale is to ensure the liquid-
ity of the system, to prevent speculative investment, and to impede capital flight under ad-
verse economic conditions in the national economy. This mechanism is also present in the 
FTAs with Canada (Annex G-09.1), Mexico (Annex 9-10), South Korea (Annex 10.11), the US 
(Annex 10-F clause 7), and Japan (Annex 8 clause 1). 
Overall, the investment measures in Chile’s FTAs are designed for the purpose of attracting 
more FDI by giving certainty to the respective counterparts on the investment regime that 
will frame the economic relationship. Although Chile designs and has adopted rules to pro-
tect FDI and liberalize the investment regime, it has also sought to maintain the right to pro-
tect itself in the event of currency problems. Moreover, it has also excluded sensitive issue 
areas such as investment in cultural issues and indigenous affairs. The FTAs are flexible “in-
stitutions” since they open up the possibility of including new issues in the future if the po-
litical and economic context varies. Nevertheless, this flexibility is a one-way street since it 
only applies to the liberalization of the investment regime. Therefore, FTAs are there to pro-
vide certainty through establishing rule-based mechanisms to deal with the growing move-
ment of goods, capital and services as consequence of economic globalization. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
12  These FTAs also protect the respective investments as the BITs do, yet the former have a broader scope as 
they include new issues. Here I will only focus on the new issues included in the FTAs that follow a NAFTA 
or a NAFTA-improved model since the other were generally covered in the BITs. 
13  This is also the case for the FTAs with Mexico, Central America, US, EU, South Korea, and EFTA. 
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5 Ideational Aspects in Chile’s FTA Policy 
Chile’s FTA policy and its keenness to share its FTA experience may be the consequence of a 
long-term socialization process and of an intersubjective understanding within Chilean soci-
ety that has cemented the ideational aspect “market as welfare enhancer.” Internally, the contex-
tual situation of Chilean society is more oriented towards a conception of individual respon-
sibility vis-à-vis a societal pattern of collective and shared responsibility that underlies soli-
darity projects, as in the models of welfare states such as those in Scandinavia or continental 
Europe.14 A survey by the Chilean Work and Equity Commission15 (2008: 32-33) shows that 
the main reasons for economic success are seen to be the consequence of individual factors 
(50 percent) such as self-initiative (24 percent) and self-responsibility and hard work (26 per-
cent); external factors (27 percent) such as educational level (24 percent) and state economic 
support (3 percent); and family factors such as inherited money (10 percent) and family social 
contacts (12 percent). Only 3 percent of the population emphasized the role of the state as the 
main driver of economic success. These tendencies were confirmed when respondents were 
asked about the main reasons for being poor: answers concentrate mainly on individual fac-
tors (51 percent), external factors (33 percent), and family factors (16 percent). Only 8 percent 
of people believe that poverty is due to the lack of economic support from the state. 
In a survey conducted by the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) (May 2008: 59, 61) in which 
respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale of 1 (the responsibility for the means 
of economic support lies with the state) to 10 (the responsibility for the means of economic 
supports lies with the individual), the average is 6.73. It is also interesting to mention the 
fact that on a scale of 1 to 10 the average is 6.55: individual effort should be valorized and 
further stimulated (number 10 of the scale), even though this stimulation and valorization of 
individual effort may substantially affect the income distribution in the Chilean society 
(number 1 of the scale).  
The Latinobarometro (2008: 40) presents some mixed results on questions similar to those of 
the CEP poll. Those surveyed were asked to answer on a scale of 1 to 10 whether the state  
(1 of the scale) or the market (10 of the scale) is responsible for solving society’s problems. 
The average for all respondents is 4.1. This may be interpreted to mean that the role of state 
is gaining more popularity amongst Chileans; however, the questions do not specify which 
economic problems the pollsters are referring to. Nevertheless, the Latinobarometro (2007: 
23) also includes the question of whether it is fair to pay a better wage to a worker who is 
more efficient vis-à-vis others who perform the same duties but are less efficient; 57 percent 
answered that it is fair to pay more to the efficient workers. The same survey (2007: 32) also 
                                                     
14  On the importance of endogenous normative aspects and how these shape national responses to global proc-
esses, yet applied to the German case, see Schirm 2002. 
15  This commission is an initiative of President Michelle Bachelet to discuss ways to design better policies to 
create more equity in the labor market as well as a social pact for the development of Chile. 
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asks whether private companies are essential to the development of a country, and the an-
swers in the Chilean case support such a claim: 61 percent in 2004, 45 percent in 2005 and 58 
percent in 2007. Moreover, the level of support for the claim that “The market economy is the 
only pattern with which the country can achieve development” is relatively high, though the 
numbers for this claim have decreased in the last two years. However, the support for the 
statement “The state can solve all problems,” that is, economic and social ones, does not sur-
pass the preference for a market economy and has also not increased substantially in recent 
years (see Table 2). 
Table 2: The State vis-à-vis the Market 
“The state can solve all problems.” 
1998 2000 2003 2005 2007 
31% 26% 29% 33% 39% 
“The market economy is the only pattern with which the country can achieve development.”
2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 
52% 53% 62% 41% 49% 
Sources: Latinobarometro reports 2007: 30 & 32; 2008: 35. 
Despite the fact that the illustrative numbers of the different surveys presented above are 
not conclusive enough, they tentatively suggest that the way society is related as a whole is 
based on the principled idea of individual responsibility rather than on the idea of collective 
public solidarity. In addition, the state as the main promoter of economic growth seems to 
have a secondary role vis-à-vis the market for the socioeconomic system (Navia 2006). Yet 
this socioeconomic transformation was conducted in a top-down way in an authoritarian 
context (Pinochet’s regime) (Huneeus 2001, Moulian 1997). However, the democratic gov-
ernments from the 1990 onwards have validated and learned to administer the economic 
model. In fact, there has not been much variation in the market-driven economic policy dur-
ing the last four democratic governments, all of which have been center-left coalitions (La 
Concertación) (Fazio 2006; Navia 2006). 
Although each democratic government has placed a strong emphasis on social policies to 
reduce poverty and even on “leveling the playing field” for everyone, the overall orientation 
of the economic model has been preserved (Engel and Navia 2006). In this regard, it seems 
that the debate focuses on what type of capitalism Chile needs, amongst the different exist-
ing varieties, rather than on a radical ideological shift in the model (on varieties of capital-
ism see Hall and Soskice 2001). While some surveys ask whether or not the model should be 
changed and more state intervention added (and the answers favor this option), they do not 
ask which substitute model respondents are thinking of (see Chilean Work and Equity 
20 Wehner: Power, Governance, and Ideas in Chile’s Free Trade Agreement Policy  
Commission 2008: 39). The numbers supporting the principle of self-responsibility and the 
reasons for economic success suggest that the perceived need for more state involvement is 
circumscribed to the varieties of capitalism and does not go beyond this. 
The above numbers illustrate an extant reality, yet they are not conclusive enough as these 
surveys might only represent a transitory, specific time setting and thus not show whether 
there is a sedimentation of the ideational aspect “market as welfare enhancer” in the long run. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to analyze the official discourse of representatives of the 
civil society and the Chilean government to determine whether the leaders and societal 
movements validate the extant economic pattern. 
In her government program, President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) highlights the core 
principle of combining market and equity. “We need to continue walking with security on 
the path to economic development, based on seriousness and a balanced budget, without 
stopping the help to those who are left behind and need us” (Bachelet 2005: 2). She refers to 
the economic model as follows: “This prosperity will open the way to leave poverty behind 
and substantially increase the quality life of Chileans” (ibid.: 8). “Growth is not achieved 
through magic. It requires adequate policies. We will preserve our fiscal and financial poli-
cies, which have made us the first country in the world in terms of macroeconomic man-
agement according to the World Economic Forum ranking” (ibid.: 34).16
This societal convergence around the economic model has facilitated the government’s pro-
active FTA policy. As Hector Casanueva, former representative of the Chilean government 
on external trade issues under the governments of Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos, de-
clared in relation to the wide acceptance within civil society of the economic model and the 
bilateral economic policy, 
It is necessary to highlight that this strategy has a broad base of support in Chilean so-
ciety. And this is an essential component that allows the continuity and security of this 
process. There is a national consensus among the different political views within Con-
gress, the private sector, and the labor unions, with some slight differences, as it 
should be, but no radical or big challenges to the economic model. Other groups of 
civil society also accept the model despite the normal differences of opinion. Thus, the 
international presence—economic—in Chile is not an issue in itself; what it is dis-
cussed in different sectors or national levels are opportunities, moments, and how this 
process can be administered in a better way, but not the essence of this policy in itself. 
(Casanueva 2001: 32)17
Another survey shows 73.9 percent support for Chile’s FTA policy as a whole; only 6.4 per-
cent of those surveyed were against it (IDEP November 2002: 2). An interesting example is 
                                                     
16  Author’s translation. 
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the FTA negotiation with the US, which is perhaps the actor that generates the most contro-
versy and divergence, amongst elites as well as in civil society in general, on the Latin 
American continent. When the FTA negotiation between Chile and the US was launched, the 
level of support for it was 81 percent (Fundación Futuro 2000: 12). Support for this negotia-
tion and for the external trade policy in general is also present amongst groups that were 
traditionally and ideologically against a free-market approach, such as the labor unions. As 
the then advisor on commercial matters of the largest labor union in Chile, the Central Uni-
taria de Trabajadores (CUT), Alfredo Arrieta (2001: 69) said, 
The Chilean workers’ union movement supports the negotiations the government is 
conducting, not only with the US but also with Mercosur, APEC, and the EU […] The 
Chilean workers consider this to be a unique opportunity for the country because until 
now the model has been exclusive and this may become a good chance to convert it 
into a model of development and integrative growth.18
While the cemented value-based idea of “market as welfare enhancer” facilitates the implementa-
tion of Chile’s external trade policy in a consensual way by economic and political elites, it 
does not provide a contextual understanding of Chile’s willingness to share its negotiating ex-
perience with potential economic competitors, nor its invitations to and support for other 
Latin American countries joining extant economic forums and FTAs. Chile supported and 
promoted Peru’s entrance to APEC, and it currently supports the memberships of Colombia, 
Panama, and Ecuador whenever APEC opens new application processes. Chile has invited 
Peru to be part of the P4 (Furche 2008) and it also expects that Colombia will join in the near 
future (Americas Society and Council of the Americas 2006, Estrada 2006, El Colombiano 28/11/ 
2006). According to trade diplomats from Chile (Andrés Rebolledo 25/03/2008) and Costa Rica 
(Laura Rodriguez 08/07/2008, Gabriela Llobet 02/07/2008) and Chile’s former minister of for-
eign affairs, Soledad Alvear (see Verdugo 2005: 146), Chile is always willing to share its past 
FTA negotiating experiences with other Latin American countries. This extends to sharing the 
details of the timing and the amount of initial offers regarding specific products given by 
counterparts, for example, the US (anonymous interview 04/07/2008). This seems illogical ac-
cording to a cost-benefit analysis since these countries may get a better deal if they manage the 
momentum of the negotiations over sensitive products. This may also give them privileged 
access to the US market due to their lower transportation costs. 
Considering that Chile feels unique and far removed from the reality of other Latin Ameri-
can countries, it is puzzling to observe this phenomenon of it sharing its negotiation experi-
ence and inviting countries to join already established commercial accords. Chileans per-
ceive themselves as different from the rest of the Latin Americans (57 percent), and they 
                                                                                                                                                                     
17  Author’s translation. 
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tend to think that there is no such thing as a Latino culture on the continent (75 percent) 
(Adimark-PUC 2008: 39-40, 43-44, 48). A plausible explanation for this Chilean openness to 
sharing with and inviting other countries lies precisely in this self-constructed uniqueness 
and in the criticisms Chile has received from other countries for not paying too much atten-
tion to the Latin American continent in its external relations. 
Jorge Larrain (2005: 7-15) persuasively argues that this uniqueness is an identity project 
conducted in a top-down way that hides the cultural and identitarian heterogeneity of a na-
tion. Therefore, this uniqueness is only one version of the Chilean identity. Whereas Lar-
rain´s argument identifies other identity aspects, I argue that the one which prevails in 
Chile’s external economic relations is that of differentiation from the rest of Latin America. 
Moreover, it seems to be the case that a majority of Chilean society agrees with this dialecti-
cal differentiation. Yet identity is not only about the past and the present, that is, what a 
country is, but also about the future projection of what a country wants to be. 
Whereas Chilean society perceives itself as different, the political elite expect to change this 
self-perception of not belonging to the rest of Latin America (Miranda 23/10/2004). In this 
regard, the articulation of narratives and discourses of self-identification with other coun-
tries that share similar notions of valued-based ideas on the path of development may be a 
first step towards constructing more ideational convergence. As then president Ricardo La-
gos (21/05/2005) stated in 2005, “We have said over and over again that Latin America is our 
big nation and that we make our foreign policy from this region.”19 Discursive commitments 
and meaningful actions towards helping, sharing, and supporting the economic integration 
of other countries by inviting them to join extant trade accords might be used as a framing 
mechanism to create self-identification with others. The construction of this self-identifica-
tion serves as an identity mark for developing a greater sense of belonging to Latin America. 
However, this identity mark is far from being cemented in Chile as it competes with existing 
value-based ideas of uniqueness or differentiation. 
Therefore, helping potentially like-minded Latin American countries may enhance both the 
developmental pattern of Chile and that of its potential partners. These potentially like-
minded countries share the ideational aspect that an open economy improves the life standards 
of citizens and achieves sustainable economic growth. As they are in the earlier stages of imple-
menting a market-driven economic model, ideational understandings based on the market 
as welfare-creating are not yet solid enough. Chile thus sees its own economic experience as 
valuable and shareable. In this regard, the market as a valued-based idea acts as the core 
driving force in creating potential “selves” on a continent where there are large divergences 
in the patterns of economic development. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
18  Author’s translation. 
19  Author’s translation. 
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It would be naïve to think that a public statement from government representatives outlin-
ing societal ideas does not have the hidden agenda of realizing and promoting material in-
terests. With regard to open sharing and inviting others to join extant commercial projects, 
the intention may be to balance the interventionist economic projects promoted by countries 
such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina. It could also be a way to improve Chile’s always 
controversial relations with Peru. Yet it is no less true that the manner and intensity of pro-
moting these material interests, such as the incentive of more jobs and more goods as well as 
the ability of market-driven countries to compete in a better way in the global economic 
world, are also facilitated by Chile’s societal convergence on the idea of the “market as welfare 
enhancer.” The latter ideational dimension is thus used in Chile’s foreign policy as an iden-
tity mark that enhances the country’s own developmental path and that of potentially like-
minded countries on the Latin American continent (see Summary in Table 3). 
Table 3: Summary of Power, Governance, and Ideational Forces in Chile’s FTA Policy 
Instruments Goals 
Power •  Soft balancing other integration schemes in the region 
•  Reducing dependence on global hubs 
•  Increasing the country’s status 
Governance •  Locking in the model through rule-based FTAs 
•  Attracting long-term FDI by creating nondiscriminatory rules 
•  Preventing severe effects during economic crises 
Ideas With regard to Latin America: 
•  Shaping how integration should be 
•  Promoting Chile’s neoliberal model 
•  Helping potentially like-minded countries 
•  Establishing a sense of belonging to the continent 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
6 Conclusion 
This article has addressed both the strategic goals, expressed in terms of power goals and 
the need for closer mechanisms of governance than those available at the multilateral level, 
and the ideational aspects of Chile’s FTA policy. These political-economic strategic goals 
and ideational aspects are not as apparent in the short term as the pure economic rationale 
for pursuing FTAs. However, the pursuit of power and the need for governance institutions 
and norms do not contradict the utility-maximizing economic logic as they provide for a bet-
ter understanding of the reasons for negotiating with a diverse array of countries or regions 
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with which the volume of trade ranges from extremely low, as is the case with Vietnam, to 
extremely high, as is the case with China, the EU, and the US. 
Chile’s FTA policy can be explained by the country’s power distribution and its relative 
power position in the global and regional systems; by its need as a small country in economic 
affairs to follow and improve the extant mechanisms to manage the economic world by 
bringing and adapting these rules to its economic and political context; and by the influence 
of a societal understanding around ideational aspects that provide the context in which this 
FTA policy is proactively pursued and implemented. In addition, Chile’s self-perceived di-
vergence from Latin American countries in economic affairs and cultural issues causes gov-
ernment representatives to try to shift this self-conception through concrete and meaningful 
actions such as inviting potentially like-minded Latin American countries to join extant 
commercial accords and sharing its vast negotiating experience. None of these three forces—
power, governance, and ideas—can be evaluated separately. While power-based goals and 
the need to manage economic issues through institutional settings are evident (power and in-
stitutions), Chile’s extreme proactivity in negotiating FTAs with most countries within the 
economically interdependent world cannot be understood without the contextual framework 
provided by a valued-based ideas approach. Therefore, power, governance, and ideas are 
also constitutive forces that drive Chile to pursue such a proactive FTA policy. 
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